There are two (equally obvious, equally compelling) answers to the question as to whether you are your brain. As a neuroscientist, I am inclined to argue ‘Of course you are’; and, as a philosopher, to argue ‘Of course you are not’.
The first answer is supported by evidence from observation of the effects of brain damage and of brain stimulation on consciousness and the sense of self.
The second answer is supported by highlighting features of consciousness -notably intentionality or ‘aboutness’ – that are not seen in the physical world of which the brain is a part. ‘Of course not’ is reinforced by the unity of conscious experience, and the way such experience adds up to and coheres in a self, for which there can be no physical explanation.
I will endeavour to reconcile these opposing answers to the question by distinguishing between brain activity as a necessary condition of consciousness and selfhood, as a sufficient condition of consciousness and selfhood, and as being identical with consciousness and selfhood.
In doing so, I will highlight what may charitably be described as ‘the unfinished business’ of neurophilosophy and more honestly as ‘the total mess’ of its current state.