Immanuel Kant’s account of the nature of moral judgement appears cold and unrealisable in his insistence that we must act ‘out of duty to the moral law’, and in his rejection of the value of emotions for developing moral judgments and motivating moral action.
I will discuss three influential accounts of morality based on emotions that came before Kant, and against which he was arguing, the accounts of Aristotle, Descartes and Hume. Then I will explore Kant’s view, by reference to his essay, “What is Enlightenment?” (1784) and to the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), in which Kant argues that our judgements must be free from the desires and inclinations that shape ordinary judgements and actions in order for them to play a role in moral thinking.
I will suggest a way in which emotions do play a role in Kant’s view, however, by looking more closely at the link Kant makes between thinking and freedom, and at the universalising and powerful feelings understanding this relationship gives rise to.